POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTROVERSIAL BILLS: ABOLITION OF THE SENATE, AND EXTENSION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL TENURE

Abstract

The Constitution of the Republic of Malawi prescribes law-making as the primary function of the legislature. The Constitution also entreats the Members of Parliament (MPs) to deliberate with the interests of all Malawians, and the spirit of national policy, at heart. The legitimate expectation therefore is that the Parliamentarians will support and pass only those bills bearing a promise to enhance public policy for quality delivery of public goods and services. This has often not been the case as, more often than not, the MPs have supported, and in some cases, passed, bills that have carried little or no regard to public interest and principles of national policy. Two legislative proposals―the Bill abolishing the Senate, and the Bill amending the Constitution to remove presidential term limit―have been cited as evidence of this dereliction of constitutional duty. On their part, many Parliamentarians have blamed commentators and analysts for making comments without understanding the complex context in which MPs operate. This research used the neo-institutional theory to establish the power relations underlying reasons MPs support bills that carry little or no public value. Employing the archival and the case study strategies, this qualitative research found that factors that determine decisions on bills are largely exogenous to the institution of Parliament. The study also established a seemingly eerie coincidence of occurrences regarding the introduction of the two Bills, Corruption Indexes for Malawi slipping into a decline in the early 2000s. The study therefore calls for further research to ascertain how exactly proliferation of controversial bills undermines policy interventions set to curb public sector corruption in Malawi.