IN DEFENSE OF PETER SINGER’S SENTIENTISM AS A THEORY OF MORAL CONSIDERABILITY OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS

Abstract

Sentientism is one of the many theories on moral considerability of nonhuman animals. The underlying argument of this theory is that any being which has feeling should be accorded moral considerability. But sentientist scholars of nonhuman animals are of different views. Peter Singer's perspective on sentientism as a theory of moral considerability of nonhuman animals is that nonhuman animals are sentient beings and emphasis of their sentientism should be put on pain and suffering. He strongly refutes other grounds of basing the sentience of nonhuman animals propagated by other sentientist scholars such as basing on cognitive grounds. He thinks that other grounds of basing sentientism of nonhuman animals are controversial and may miss the real point of awarding moral considerability to nonhuman animals (Singer, 1985). Thus, this study set out to analyse Peter Singer's sentientism as a theory of moral considerability of nonhuman animals in order to find out its merits and demerits so as to understand whether the theory is defensible for refuting all other grounds of basing sentientism of moral considerability of nonhuman animals. The study used a qualitative research method particularly a desk research. The findings reveal that peter singer's sentientism as a theory of moral considerability of nonhuman animals has a significant impact as far as the studies on moral considerability of nonhuman animals are concerned basing on the merits exposed. Further the study has also revealed that Peter Singer’s sentientism is not without lacking basing on the demerits exposed. Furthermore the study argues that although Peter Singer’s Sentientism has some demerits but the theory has significant positive impact as far as moral considerability of nonhuman animals is concerned therefore the theory is defensible.